IFS Working Paper “A New U.S.–DPRK Dialogue: Korea at a Crossroads—Seeking Counsel from Senior Statesmen”

• Publication date 2026-11-03
• Hit 363
IFS Working Paper 2026-02
“A New U.S.–DPRK Dialogue: Korea at a Crossroads—Seeking Counsel from Senior Statesmen”
 
In-joo Sohn (Acting Director, Institute for Future Strategy, Seoul National University)
Chung-in Moon (Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Yonsei University)
Min-soon Song (34th Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
Young-kwan Yoon (32nd Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade)
Dal-joong Chang (Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University)
Byung-yeon Kim (Endowed Chair Professor, Department of Economics, Seoul National University; Moderator)
 
This working paper summarizes the discussion at the roundtable “A New U.S.–DPRK Dialogue: Korea at a Crossroads—Seeking Counsel from Senior Statesmen,” hosted by the Institute for Future Strategy at Seoul National University on October 21, 2026. As President Trump repeatedly raised the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit and North Korea defined inter-Korean relations as those between two “hostile states,” four senior figures in diplomacy and security discussed the prospects for a new U.S.–North Korea dialogue, managing the risks posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, recalibrating the ROK–U.S. alliance, nuclear latency, and South Korea’s national strategy amid U.S.–China competition.
The panelists warned of the risks of “Yalta 2.0”—in which great powers decide the fate of the Korean Peninsula without regard for South Korea’s wishes—and “Acheson 2.0,” in which South Korea is sidelined in U.S. strategic priorities. These risks arise as the second Trump administration relinquishes U.S. leadership of the liberal international order and views alliances through a transactional lens. On the prospect of dialogue with North Korea, some argued that the United States should offer bolder incentives than it did at the Hanoi summit and prioritize managing nuclear risks over denuclearization. Others warned that, regardless of whether negotiations take place, the Korean Peninsula faces a “lock-in” of North Korea’s nuclear status, and that negotiations beginning with “sanctions relief in exchange for a nuclear freeze” would, in effect, recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.
Views on strategy toward the United States also diverged. Some argued that South Korea should use its industrial strengths—including shipbuilding, semiconductors, nuclear power, and defense—to secure the fulfillment of U.S. security commitments. Others called for expanding South Korea’s autonomy within the alliance by pursuing the transfer of wartime operational control and developing nuclear latency, including uranium enrichment. Still others argued that South Korea should move beyond reliance on the United States and pursue a multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia. Clear differences also emerged over the value of nuclear latency, strategic ambiguity versus clarity, and the possibility of finding common ground with North Korea on policy rationality.
Despite these differences, the panelists agreed on the need to develop a long-term national strategy looking 20 to 30 years ahead, build domestic consensus that transcends partisan lines by overcoming the ideological polarization of diplomacy and security policy, and draw on South Korea’s capabilities from a broader perspective that extends beyond the four neighboring powers.