An Era of Great Transformation and Polarization. - What Should the State Do?

• Publication date 2026-11-01
• Hit 305
대전환과 양극화의 시대 - 국가는 무엇을 해야 하는가

Facing an Era of Great Transformation

We are living in an era of great transformation. Across the globe, many established orders are collapsing all at once. The age of ideology has come to an end. The Cold War is over. Even American hegemony, which seemed likely to endure after the Cold War, is being shaken from within and without. Russia is threatening a Europe that had been at peace since the Second World War, and wars are becoming more frequent. The United States is at war with Iran, and Russia is at war with Ukraine. Has there ever been a time when the world’s two leading military powers were at war for so long? Meanwhile, China’s rise in international standing and economic power has been remarkable. The world and international order we once knew have disappeared entirely over the past twenty years.

The technological transition is even more dramatic. It was only a generation ago that the internet, email, and mobile phones began to enter our daily lives, and now we are entering the age of AI. Some call it the AI Revolution, drawing a parallel with the agricultural and industrial revolutions experienced by humanity. What is astonishing is not so much the emergence of AI itself as the speed of its development and the scale of its impact. AI is remarkable as a technology in its own right, but it is on an entirely different scale from previous technological advances because it can be applied across every other field. This change will affect far more than how we work: it has the potential to transform jobs, industrial ecosystems, national competitiveness, individual lives, and humanity as a whole.

The fact that we are living through a period of upheaval is also evident in the climate crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic made clear that the climate crisis is not merely a threat to the planet’s distant future, but a factor that can endanger our lives right now. Rapid changes in the global environment bring diseases and disasters that humanity struggles to control. The immediate cause of COVID-19 was the spread of a zoonotic disease, but biologists such as Professor Jae Chun Choe argue that it is difficult to explain, apart from climate change, why bats that had lived for centuries in tropical rainforests moved north into temperate regions inhabited by people. The destruction of ecosystems and changes in the environment are increasing the risk of infectious disease. It has been only a few years since we experienced society coming to a standstill, yet we seem to have completely forgotten experts’ warnings that large-scale pandemics will occur periodically.

Disasters are also growing in scale. Major wildfires are breaking out across the world, and the melting of polar ice is causing many extreme weather events. Not long ago, glacial meltwater in the Himalayas triggered a massive flood that caused enormous casualties. Grain prices have also become more volatile as a result of climate disasters. Carbon-neutrality requirements are also beginning to function as trade restrictions. The climate crisis is already at our doorstep.

In Korea, the population cliff and the disappearance of local communities are particular threats driving domestic transformation. Low birth rates and an aging population have been long-standing problems, but we have yet to find an effective solution. The essence of the population crisis is not simply a decline in the size of the population, but a fundamental change in its structure. The share of the population aged 65 and over, currently 20 percent, will rise into the 40-percent range by 2050. Long-term care insurance spending is projected to more than double, from 14.6 trillion won in 2023 to 34.8 trillion won in 2032. By 2045, it is said that there will not be a single region in the Republic of Korea where more people are born than die. The number of people available for military service will fall from 330,000 in 2020 to 140,000 by 2040. This is why national security cannot be addressed with words alone.

By 2041, the number of students in Seoul’s schools will have fallen by one-third. Universities currently have an annual admissions capacity of 400,000, while 230,000 babies were born in 2023. Given that about 75 percent of students go on to university, by the 2042 academic year, when this cohort reaches university age, the number of prospective university entrants will fall below half of the current annual admissions capacity. This means that in just fifteen years or so, roughly half of all universities will have to close. Most of them will be regional universities. Changes in the population structure and the disappearance of local communities could lead to the contraction and collapse of the entire social system.

Crises Do Not Affect Everyone Equally

Change has always been part of human history. The rise and fall of nations have been shaped by factors such as new technologies, geographical shifts, population changes, epidemics, and war. The question is how fast change occurs and how well we can adapt. A certain degree of change and development can drive progress for society as a whole. Civilization advances, we gain the capacity to solve new problems in the humanities and sciences, and we can overcome past errors. Humanity has learned to overcome disease and poverty, and to find ways to move beyond war and inequality. At the same time, we have gone through much trial and error. The costs of adapting to change have often been too great to dismiss as mere side effects.

What we need to pay attention to is that when change happens this quickly, its side effects are not spread evenly among everyone. Those with established privileges in society may even benefit, while the socially vulnerable suffer greater harm.

Before the AI transition, the greatest technological revolution of the modern era was the Industrial Revolution. At the time, the Enclosure Movement privatized common lands, depriving small farmers who had worked the land for generations of their livelihoods and driving them into the cities. Thomas More’s image of sheep devouring people became reality. What awaited the farmers driven into the cities was factory work lasting more than fourteen hours a day, child labor, and wretched living conditions in unsanitary slums. Industrialization and mechanization created new opportunities, but they also made artisans’ skills obsolete. The Luddite movement, in which workers smashed machines, was put down by the army. Productivity soared, but it took a very long time for the gains to translate into real wage increases for workers. In the meantime, those who monopolized land and factories accumulated wealth, and the wealth and privilege of some families have continued to this day.

We have also seen, in the Great Depression in the United States and the 1997 Asian financial crisis in Korea, that economic disasters do not affect everyone equally. In the United States in the 1930s, economic collapse and climate disaster struck at the same time. In the cities, the middle class who had invested in stocks saw their fortunes collapse; in the countryside, surplus crops went unsold, and hundreds of thousands of tenant farmers became low-paid migrant workers. Meanwhile, asset holders with cash, the major corporations and banks that survived, and landlords who bought land from small farmers gained dominant positions in the American economy. When the foreign exchange crisis hit Korea in 1997, corporate restructuring led to mass layoffs, and non-regular employment subsequently became widespread in our society. Middle-aged and older breadwinners who struggled to find new jobs, low-skilled workers, and women who were laid off first bore the greatest impact. Meanwhile, asset holders with cash and foreign capital bought up stocks and real estate at rock-bottom prices. As a result, even after the crisis had passed, the dual structure of the labor market and wealth polarization became entrenched. Today’s income and asset inequality began then.

What Changes Lie Ahead for Us?

How will the changes approaching us affect people differently in each area? Let us consider a few examples.

First, as many experts predict, automation through AI will begin by reducing jobs held by low-skilled workers. Those affected will include call center agents, administrative assistants, freelance translators and designers, platform workers, and middle-aged and older people with limited opportunities for retraining. Past automation replaced physical labor, but AI also replaces standardized knowledge work. Jobs with a high proportion of repetitive tasks are easy to automate. Yet these workers lack the time and money to learn new skills, as well as the assets to sustain them through a career change. The gains from increased productivity will go first to companies that can use AI and their shareholders. Social redistribution will take place, but there will be a delay.

Changes in the international order and advances in AI will also widen the gap between large corporations with the capacity to invest and small and medium-sized enterprises. A company’s financial capacity to respond to supply-chain restructuring resulting from changes in the international order, climate regulations and proof-of-origin requirements, and fluctuations in exchange rates, interest rates, and raw-material prices will vary greatly depending on its size. Differences will also emerge in investment for AI adoption, employee training, access to data and cybersecurity capabilities, recruiting specialized personnel, and the ability to gather information and negotiate. The government has declared its commitment to “AI for All” and is pursuing it, but this is by no means an easy task.

The climate crisis, as we experienced during COVID-19 and in the 2022 Seoul floods that inundated Gangnam Station, does not affect everyone equally. People living in semi-basement homes, tiny, substandard rooms, and goshiwon (single-room accommodation) are among the most vulnerable in terms of housing. Outdoor workers in construction, delivery, agriculture, and sanitation, as well as older people living alone who struggle to cover cooling costs, will be the first victims of climate disasters. Children and people with underlying health conditions are biologically vulnerable, while migrant workers and people with disabilities are also at risk from the climate crisis. In short, the climate crisis is most devastating for those who cannot afford to protect themselves from its risks and who struggle to recover after disaster strikes.

Viewed regionally, changes in the population structure pose a major threat to older people in rural areas and small and medium-sized cities, especially those who cannot drive. As local populations decline, hospitals, pharmacies, bus routes, and schools close. In an emergency, the distance to a hospital can determine the chance of survival. Younger people can leave for large cities, but it is difficult for older people to do the same. Their only asset, local real estate, loses value. Meanwhile, as resources and people concentrate in the Seoul metropolitan area, property values there continue to rise. If we cannot slow this trend, the future of the Republic of Korea will be at serious risk.

At the national level, the population cliff will put pressure on pension finances. It could also undermine national solidarity through conflict between generations. Korea’s elderly poverty rate is among the highest in the OECD. Today’s poor older people, many of whom have spent little or no time enrolled in the National Pension system, have little choice but to hope that future pension funding will support them. But younger generations, who will bear that future burden, will see things differently. As the working-age population shrinks, fiscal pressure grows, and discussions of benefit cuts are likely to target the groups with the least political voice. This dynamic could fuel intergenerational conflict and weaken solidarity.

The collapse of the care system is another concern. As families become smaller and ties weaken, it is inevitable that the market and the state will have to take on the care responsibilities once shouldered by families. Yet care work is still undervalued and poorly paid, and migrant workers and middle-aged and older women are filling the gap. The gap between households with reliable access to long-term care facilities and those without it will inevitably widen. Even today, many older people living alone are isolated without care and exposed to the risk of dying alone.

How Should the State Respond?

These are the national crises now approaching us. We must prepare thoroughly and hold on to hope for change, while also asking who will be most vulnerable to it, because we are one community. Some will imagine a rosy future and be filled with hope, but a considerable number of people are likely to live with anxiety, anger, and resignation. To adapt to change, we have to pass through a valley of transition, and we cannot leave those who fall behind in that valley. From the outset, those who bear the burden of the crisis and those who reap the benefits after the transition should not be different groups.

So, what should the state do?

First, it must redesign the safety net so that individuals do not have to bear the shock of transition alone.
Today’s employment safety net is designed around regular employees who remain with the same employer for many years. Platform workers, freelancers, and workers who change jobs frequently are left outside it. We need to shift to a system in which protection is tied to people rather than to the jobs they hold. We also need to combine retraining with income support so people can learn new skills without worrying about making ends meet while changing careers.

Second, we must now begin discussing a social system that ensures the gains from AI-driven productivity do not accumulate only among a small number of companies and asset holders.
The lesson of the Industrial Revolution and the financial crisis is that fair distribution never follows automatically. We must reform the tax and social insurance systems so that those who gain significantly from the transition also share its costs, while jointly supporting small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to data, computing infrastructure, and specialized personnel so that they can adopt AI. “AI for All” becomes meaningful only when it is backed by policies like these, rather than remaining a slogan.

Third, our response to the climate crisis must shift toward preventing harm before it occurs.
We should act quickly to help residents of semi-basement homes and tiny, substandard rooms secure safer housing as part of disaster preparedness. During heat waves and cold spells, we must expand energy assistance so that no one loses their life because of the cost of heating or cooling, and put policies in place to guarantee outdoor workers the right to stop working and rest when the weather is dangerous.

Fourth, we must respond to changes in the population structure.
Pension reform must be an intergenerational agreement that leaves neither today’s poor older people nor future generations behind. Building that consensus is the task of politics. Even in areas with declining populations, we must protect the basic foundations of life: hospitals, pharmacies, buses, and care. This is not a matter to be judged by market efficiency; it concerns people’s fundamental rights and a nationally guaranteed minimum standard of living (National Minimum). We must maintain public hospitals serving as regional hubs and emergency medical networks; provide on-demand transportation that comes when called in places where bus routes have disappeared; and establish integrated community care that connects medical services with care for older people living alone. We cannot call ourselves a community if the chance of survival depends on where a person lives.

"The state is different from a business. It cannot restructure the way a company does. Doing so would destroy trust across the community. A state cannot exist for even a moment without a basic spirit of mutual support and solidarity for the common good across generations, regions, and social classes."

That is why we need a national strategy to prepare for the future. I hope that the Seoul National University Institute for Future Strategy will take the lead in extending these discussions and the search for solutions throughout society.